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JURY PRACTICE IN POST-TRUTH AMERICA:
A CAUTIONARY NOTE
Richard A. Harpootlian
Christopher P. Kenney *
Trial lawyers and judges like to regale jurors with the fact that the word
“verdict” comes from the Latin veredicto, meaning “to speak the truth.” 1 When
a jury reaches a verdict, it speaks truth by resolving factual disputes between the
parties. Did the defendant shoot the victim? Was the plaintiff injured when the
contract was breached? Disputed facts are proven or disproven through the
presentation of evidence, testimony and tangible objects that make the existence
of a fact more or less probable. 2 This basic formula—evidence proving facts,
facts informing truth—is fundamental to our notion of ordered liberty and the
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial.
Truth-seekers are a beleaguered lot in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential
election, a campaign whose winner was propelled to victory by demagoguery,
racism, sexism, and a willful resistance to any fact that challenged these
grotesque views. While ambitious public office-seekers have long stretched the
truth, Donald Trump’s indifference to it altogether confounded political
opponents and challenged the fourth estate to reconcile its commitment to
objectivity with a documentarian’s moral obligation to call a lie a lie. 3 There is

* Richard “Dick” A. Harpootlian and Christopher “Chris” P. Kenney are trial lawyers in Columbia, South
Carolina at Richard A. Harpootlian, P.A. where their practice includes whistleblower, class action, personal
injury, wrongful death, complex business litigation, and criminal defense work.
Dick Harpootlian is a former chair of the South Carolina Democratic Party and early supporter of Barack
Obama. In 1990, Harpootlian was elected district attorney for the judicial circuit that includes Columbia, South
Carolina. In 1983, while serving as the district’s deputy prosecutor, he obtained a conviction and death sentence
for Donald “Pee Wee” Gaskins, the state’s most notorious serial killer. During his more than 30 years as a
prosecutor, defense attorney, and civil litigator, Harpootlian has tried hundreds of cases to a jury verdict.
The authors would like to thank Yani Mouratev for his research assistance and the editors and staff of
the Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review for their editorial work. The views expressed here,
or any errors made in so doing, belong to the authors and the authors alone.
1 See, e.g., Ralph King Anderson, Jr., South Carolina Requests to Charge–Civil, 2009, § 1-1 (preliminary
charge on general matters).
2 See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence as evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.”)
3 Liz Spayd, When to Call a Lie a Lie, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/09/20/public-editor/trump-birther-lie-liz-spayd-public-editor.html.
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something pernicious about disputing facts by rejecting evidence outright. It
threatens clear thinking and poses the ultimate distraction by attacking the
predicate to any informed policy debate. 4 While Hillary Clinton was a
predictably flawed candidate, 5 she marshaled the facts against her general
election opponent with lawyerly competence. An alarmingly large electoral
plurality did not care. Lawyers and litigants alike should find this result troubling
because, far more than the nation’s political institutions, the jury system’s
reliance on evidence-based reasoning is fundamental to its operation and the
predictable, orderly administration of justice.
The assault on evidence-based reasoning was forefront in our minds the
week after Donald Trump’s surprise election victory as we sat in a Richland
County, South Carolina courtroom next to Jermaine Davis—a 16-year-old,
African-American male charged with murder—and prepared to strike 12 jurors
and two alternates to hear evidence the State claimed would prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jermaine shot and killed a man walking home from a
neighborhood convenience store. Since our investigation revealed facts that cast
serious doubt on the State’s allegations, we believed Jermaine would be
exonerated if jurors followed the evidence. As our recent trial work alerted us to
the threat posed by evidence-adverse jurors, we endeavored to do what trial
counsel must in the current litigation environment: identify and exclude them.
***
Jermaine’s representation was an unusual one for our office. Jermaine is a
ward of the State of South Carolina who had spent the last nine years in the
“care” of the State Department of Social Services. Jermaine’s childhood was not
a happy one as he spent almost a decade being bounced between 15 different
foster placements and two group homes. During the summer of 2016, he ran
away from the last group home placement in Columbia, South Carolina and had
been living on the streets when he was arrested by the Richland County Sheriff’s
Department and charged in the shooting. When our practice takes a criminal
representation, it routinely quotes a six-figure fee. Jermaine fired his public
defender and hired our office for five ($5) dollars.

4 See Masha Gessen, Arguing the Truth with Trump and Putin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2016) http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/12/17/opinion/sunday/arguing-the-truth-with-trump-and-putin.html?ref=opinion.
5 Jim Morrill, S.C. Democrat tries to jumpstart Biden bandwagon, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, (Aug. 18,
2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article31440230.html (“‘I don’t believe
[Clinton] can beat the Republican in 2016,’ Harpootlian says.”).
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Jermaine gave the police a written statement denying he shot the victim.
They charged him anyway. The State had no DNA, no fingerprints, and no
eyewitnesses linking Jermaine to the killing. The only witness was a woman
who did not see anything, but heard shots outside her apartment window
followed by the revving of a car engine and the squealing of tires. A ballistics
report on the bullet retrieved from the victim’s chest and another found nearby
indicated the murder weapon was likely a semi-automatic pistol, but police
found no shell casings at the scene. Nor was the victim robbed of the cash,
wallet, or cell phone found in his pockets. This, and other circumstantial
evidence, strongly suggested a possible drive-by shooting—a theory inapposite
to the State’s theory that Jermaine followed the victim from the convenience
store and shot him over a brief verbal altercation some three days earlier.
The testimony of star prosecution witnesses cast further doubt on the State’s
theory and the soundness of the police’s investigation. When the State called
Jermaine’s 16-year old girlfriend to the stand to testify she saw him with a gun
the day of the shooting, she testified she did not see him with a gun that day, but
that the story she told police actually occurred earlier that week. She explained
the police pressured her to change her story, threatened to charge her as an
accessory to murder, and showed her a holding cell. The girl’s mother
corroborated this account, explaining her teenage daughter was so visibly
distraught during the interrogation that she could see the girl’s heart beating in
her chest. In fact, the last time Jermaine’s girlfriend saw the gun, it was in the
home of the State’s other key witness: Terrance.
Terrance, another black, 16-year-old youth, was living in the apartment of a
woman who took him in after his mother kicked him out for bad behavior. Over
the summer, he befriended Jermaine and the two boys were frequently seen at
the convenience store together including on the night of the murder and three
days earlier when both boys had words with the victim. The only testable DNA
recovered by police showed that Terrance, or “T”, had worn Jermaine’s
hoodie—the same hoodie police claimed was used to conceal the gun the night
of the shooting. The alleged murder weapon was never recovered, but was last
seen in a purse behind the sofa in the apartment where T was living. Police
recovered the empty purse, not behind the sofa, but in T’s room. After police
arrested him, T claimed Jermaine told him that he (Jermaine) shot the victim.
Unlike Jermaine’s girlfriend, whose mother was present during coercive police
questioning, T was interrogated twice without a parent, guardian, or lawyer
present. None of the interrogations were recorded or videotaped. After T rolled
on Jermaine, T was charged with misprision of a felony. With Jermaine facing
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a possible life sentence for a crime he did not commit, our primary concern was
seating a jury that would be guided by the evidence or, rather, an extraordinary
lack of evidence, implicating Jermaine.
***
The modern American jury’s role as fact finder traces its roots to an early
nineteenth century shift that divested the jury of its authority to decide questions
of law. 6 During the colonial and post-Revolutionary period, American juries
routinely exercised the power to decide the law, often with little direction from
the court and sometimes in contravention to the law as explained by the court. 7
This near absolute power over legal and plenary matters accorded with the trial
court’s modest role of maintaining order, jurists with little or no legal training,
and an overarching belief that the entirety of a dispute was put before the jury
for decision. 8 Accordingly, when the Supreme Court empaneled a jury in 1794,
Chief Justice John Jay charged:
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old
rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions
of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed
that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of
jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to
judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have
no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the
court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best
judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the court are
the best judges of law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your
power of decision. 9

However, by the 1830s, the legal landscape of jury power had taken its present
shape whereby courts, guided by precedent or legislative enactment, instructed
juries on the law and set aside verdicts that departed from that instruction. 10 In
1835, Justice Joseph Story, while sitting as a circuit court judge, articulated the
modern view that “[i]t is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law;
6 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United States,
61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 902–21 (1994); Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury’s Role as Finder of Fact, 20
Ga. L. Rev. 123, 128–34 (1985).
7 Alschuler, supra note 6 at 903–04.
8 Id. at 903–06.
9 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794). (emphasis added).
10 See W. Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Changes on
Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830, p. 8 (1975).
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and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.” 11
One leading commentator attributes this shift to an effort to meet the needs of a
burgeoning business community by promoting more certain or predictable
litigation outcomes in a rapidly changing public sphere. 12
This change was practical and normative “as American[s] perception of the
jury changed from seeing it as a protective barrier between the citizen and a
potentially tyrannous, corrupt state to seeing it as an instrument for the fair and
efficient administration of justice.” 13 The eighteenth century jury system tasked
citizens with picking winners and losers based not just on facts in that case, but
on what a cross-section of the community believed concerning whether
punishment or reward was owed. While this open-ended inquiry comports with
the framer’s skepticism toward the exercise of government power, it could not
be justified following the rise of a professional legal class, maturation of a robust
jurisprudence, adoption of extensive legislative codifications, and the inclusion
of ethnically, religiously, and ideologically heterogeneous jurors in the venire.
Contemporary reappraisals of the jury’s role raise more arguments urging
caution than supporting reforms that would allow juries to again decide
questions of law. 14 Thus, to the extent modern jury procedure is designed to
resolve factual disputes, decision-making that occurs in spite of trial evidence is
a real threat to that system.
***
Our concerns in Jermaine’s case arose one year earlier during a civil suit
tried to a $1.6 million verdict in Richland County. In that dispute, captioned
Stevens & Wilkinson v. City of Columbia, our client, and one of South
Carolina’s most reputable architectural firms, sued the city for breach of contract
over unpaid fees. In preparing our trial strategy, we focused grouped the case
with two groups of 10 citizens. Our findings were critical.
The sole question at trial was whether the city contracted with the
architectural firm to continue work on construction drawings for a publically
financed hotel while the city waited for bond financing to close so construction
could begin. Believing they had a contract and would be paid for the work, the
architectural firm finished the hotel drawings. Meanwhile, the bonds never

11
12
13
14

United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
Nelson, supra note.10.
Kotler, supra note.6 at 127–28.
See id. at 135–72.
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closed, city politics changed, and support for a publically financed hotel
evaporated. When Stevens & Wilkinson sought payment for their work, the city
disclaimed the contract. Evidence the jury would hear at trial supported only one
of two possible conclusions. If the jury believed the city, there was no contract
and nothing was owed. However, if the jury believed our client, the architectural
firm was entitled to a weekly rate multiplied by the number of weeks it worked—
an amount that equaled $1.6 million.
Our pretrial focus groups revealed a serious possible pitfall in an otherwise
strong case. When the focus group moderator presented the facts, both groups
were unanimous: there was a contract; the city breached the contract. But when
our moderator began polling the first group on the question of damages,
troubling outliers emerged. Without much thought, the first four individuals
favored an award of $1.6 million—the only conclusion possible based on the
facts they were given. The fifth group member: $600,000. Our curious
moderator paused, “tell me why you say $600,000.” A slightly overweight white
man in his early 60s with a snowy, unkempt beard and overalls rocked back
slightly in his chair. “Well,” he began, “$1.6 million is an awful lot of money
and $600,000 just seems fair,” he concluded without further explanation. Our
moderator paused, waiting for explication. When it did not follow, he gently
pressed, “well, does it matter to you that the evidence will show that what they
agreed to adds up to $1.6 million?” Without hesitation, “nope. $600,000. That’s
what’s fair.”
Two more panelists were polled: $1.6 million for each and, on the other side
of the wall, we began to breathe easier. Then another man, also white, mid-40s
with creased, leathery skin and a goatee uncrossed his arms, peaked out from
under the bill of his camouflage ball cap and said, “I’d do 400.” While looking
at the bearded man, he continued, “but 600 is ok with me too.” Again, the
moderator probed: “What about this document that says they agreed to pay a
certain amount each week? Doesn’t that add up to $1.6 million?” “Yep, but that
don’t mean I agree with that.” “What if the architect ends up losing money at
$400,000 because they had to pay people to draw hundreds of pages of detailed
blueprints?” “That don’t matter because that’s not what I would give’em,” he
said, pushing back from the table and re-crossing his arms to signal that was the
end of the matter. The second panel of 10 yielded a similar result with the
overwhelming majority following the facts while two panelists—this time a
middle-aged accountant and a stay-at-home mom—took a facts-be-damned
approach.
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After our moderator thanked the second group he joined us in the room next
door where we had watched the discussion from a big screen TV. “Well,” he
rubbed his forehead while we waited for his pronouncement. “I think what you
have to take from this is there are some people who do not care about the facts.
They have a gut feeling about their view and you’re not going to dislodge it by
emphasizing the evidence.” Once he said it aloud, it was obvious which potential
jurors might harbor an aversion to evidence-based reasoning. They were white.
They lived in rural or suburban Richland County. They likely had little or no
college education. Their wages were stagnant. They were angry and motivated
by resentment. They could not identify with a deal to pay professional architects
$1.6 million for drawings. At the time we did not know it, but these panelists
would vote for Donald Trump.
***
Perhaps we should have seen this coming. Some did. In his October 17, 2005
pilot episode of The Colbert Report, Stephen Colbert coined the term
“truthiness,” which he described as belief guided by what felt true while he
derided reliance on “elitist” institutions like the Encyclopedia Britannica by
explaining it was his right to claim that the Panama Canal was completed in
1941 (. . . it was completed in 1914). 15 While Colbert’s left-leaning audience
chuckled along, he aptly drew the battle lines for the nation’s contemporary
kulturkampf between “those who think with their head and those who know with
their heart.” The following year, Merriam Webster recognized Colbert’s
contribution, choosing “truthiness” as its word of the year ahead of contenders
like “google,” “decider,” and “quagmire.” 16 A decade after Colbert’s satiric bit
defined the encroaching zeitgeist, the Oxford Dictionary recognized “post-truth”
as its 2016 word of the year 17 while the assault on evidence-based reasoning
marched on.

15 The Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.cc.com/video-clips/63ite2/the-colbert-report-the-word—truthiness; cf. Face the Nation (CBS
television broadcast Dec. 25, 2016) (discussing post-truth, truthiness, and Trump with Colbert), available at
http://www.cbs.com/shows/the-late-show-with-stephen-colbert/news/1006371/stephen-colbert-talks-trumpthe-holidays-and-the-perfect-joke-on-face-the-nation/.
16 Merriam-Webster website, Merriam-Webster Announces Truthiness’ as 2006 Word of the Year,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/press-release/2006-word-of-the-year.
17 Post-truth is an adjective defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are
less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” Oxford Dictionaries
website, “Word of the Year 2016 is . . .”, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/wordof-the-year-2016.
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These observations are supported by evidence. Consider a recent Public
Policy Polling (PPP) survey 18 that tested voters’ knowledge of objective,
measurable facts during the Obama years. Survey question 14 asked respondents
whether “you think the unemployment rate has increased or decreased since
Barack Obama became President?” Forty-one (41%) percent incorrectly
believed unemployment is up over the last eight years, while the survey’s
crosstabs explain an astonishing 67% of Trump voters held this erroneous
belief. 19 This is demonstrably false as, regardless of your view of Barack
Obama, unemployment is down since he took office on January 20, 2009. 20
Likewise, 23% of respondents and 39% of Trump voters believe “the stock
market has gone down since Barack Obama became President.” 21 On December
7 and 8, when PPP conducted its survey, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hit
record highs, 13,000 points higher than when Obama took office and inherited a
great recession. For these respondents, their belief concerning these objective
facts is not motivated by investigation, but by a feeling that Barack Obama
performed poorly as president. Even Trump expressed astonishment at this
phenomenon, aptly explaining, “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and
shoot somebody, okay, and I wouldn’t lose any voters, okay?” 22
Experienced trial practitioners have long been cognizant of how to neutralize
or exploit jury bias. For instance, belief bias recognizes that jurors are more
likely to embrace a bad argument if it leads to a conclusion they already hold
true or reject a good argument that leads to a conclusion believed false. 23
Similarly, confirmation bias causes some jurors to overemphasize certain
evidence or ignore other evidence when it supports a preferred conclusion.24
While biases have long been matters of concern, there is something qualitatively
different about a bias affecting the manner in which information is processed
versus rejection outright of the evidence’s ability to persuade. Thus, while it may
be error to give greater weight to evidence that supports a personal preference,
it is folly to simply throw the scale out the window.
18 Public Policy Polling, National Survey Results (1,224 registered voters, conducted Dec. 6–7, 2016),
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2015/PPP_Release_National_120916.pdf (hereinafter, “PPP NSR”).
19 By way of comparison, 32% of Gary Johnson and Jill Stein’s voters held this view, while just 18% of
Clinton’s voters did.
20 U.S. Dept. Labor website, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000.
21 PPP NSR, question 15, supra.
22 Ali Vitali, Trump Says He Could ‘Shoot Somebody’ and Still Maintain Support, NBC NEWS, (Jan. 23,
2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-says-he-could-shoot-somebody-still-maintainsupport-n502911.
23 Roger G. Oatley, An Overview of the Jury Bias Model, Ann. 2005 ATLA-CLE 1613.
24 Id.
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***
The adversarial jury trial remains one of the most potent civil institutions for
dispensing justice and vindicating rights provided trial counsel is prepared to
avoid seating jurors impervious to evidence-based reasoning. This requires
preparation in advance of jury selection to compile all available information
about potential jurors that can ethically be collected and a strategy that employs
strikes within constitutional bounds.
Juror research begins by collecting information made available by the clerk
of court. This information varies from court to court. South Carolina clerks of
court merely disseminate a list with names, addresses, gender, and race. The
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, on the other hand,
disseminates a detailed 47-question juror questionnaire that seeks disclosure
concerning a wide range of topics. District court questions expressly asks jurors
whether they can be fair in cases involving corporations, law enforcement,
foreign nationals, and other categories of individuals routinely subject to bias. 25
Far more helpful in detecting evidence-averse jurors are open-ended questions
soliciting disclosure concerning juror participation in social, political, civic,
religious, or other organizations; which bumper stickers were displayed on their
vehicle during the last year; the juror’s primary source(s) of news; and which
magazine and newspapers the juror regularly reads. Indeed, there is likely no
better indicator of whether an individual values objective fact-finding than an
examination of sources they rely on to gather information for them. Subscribers
to a national newspaper no doubt value objective fact-finding far more than those
reliant on a Facebook newsfeed to aggregate “newsworthy” content. 26
Beyond voir dire, trial counsel should conduct individual juror research to
gather juror voting history and information posted to social media. While
25 While striking a federal jury in November 2015, potential jurors who indicated they could not be fair in
a case involving a foreign national were so numerous that the judge expressed his own surprise from the bench.
26 Potential jurors who report relying on Facebook to aggregate news content should receive even greater
scrutiny given the proliferation of fake news on the platform and the success of fake content over mainstream
news. See Craig Silverman, “This Analysis Shows How Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News
On Facebook”, BuzzFeed, Nov. 16, 2016, available at https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fakeelection-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.ygQwp9Wg8#.tvdnrq9Ya (finding top fake
news stories generated more engagement on Facebook than top mainstream news from August to November
2016); see also Jeremy W. Peters, Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at Mainstream
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2016) (discussing right wing media campaign to undermine objective reporting
and quoting one conservative radio host lamenting, “we’ve effectively brainwashed the core of our audience to
distrust anything that they disagree with.”), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/us/politics/fake-news-claimsconservatives-mainstream-media-.html?_r=0.
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lawyers should refrain from contacting prospective jurors through social media
platforms, many users’ social media settings publically share profile
information, posts, photos, and friend lists without requiring a friend request. 27
Likewise, blogs posts, tweets, Instagrams, and other posting services publically
broadcast private views that may offer an insight or inference into the juror’s
disposition and thought process. Partisan primary voting histories, available
from a state election commissions or private data vendors, can also be a telling
source of information, particularly when coupled with other indicators. A
reliable Republican primary voting record might, but need not necessarily, be
indicative of an aversion to evidence-based reasoning. However, when this
voting record presents alongside to a steady diet of Facebook and Fox News,
trial counsel should proceed with extreme caution.
Once you have this information, be prepared to use it within the confines of
the law. The constitution forbids the exercise of preemptory challenges based on
race. 28 When a litigant mounts a “Batson challenge” to a preemptory strike by
making a prima facie showing it was motivated by race, the challenged party
must offer a race-neutral reason for the strike from which the trial court can
decide its propriety based on the totality of the circumstances. 29 When the
characteristic warranting exclusion is typically identifiable within a single racial
group (e.g., white people), trial counsel must consistently apply the rationale for
striking jurors both within that group and across racial lines. 30 Counsel must also
be prepared to justify the strike, which might require divulging juror research to
substantiate a claim that counsel’s strategy is based in fact.
***

27 Unless limited by law or court order, lawyers may review juror Internet presence before or during trial
without such passive activity constituting communication prohibited by Model Rule 3.5(b). ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_466_final_04_23_14.authcheckdam.pdf.
A lawyer may not, directly or indirectly, send an access request to a juror’s social media account. Id.
28 In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court held equal protection forbade the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race and established a burden-shifting procedure for proving
a violation. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court expanded Batson’s holding beyond the exclusion
of jurors sharing the defendant’s race.
29 See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016) (summarizing Batson’s procedure); see also
Batson, supra n.28.
30 See, e.g., Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1750–52 (noting explanations given by prosecutors were “difficult to
credit because the State willingly accepted white jurors with the same traits that supposedly rendered [a black
juror] an unattractive juror[,]” and that if the age of a [black] juror’s son “was the issue, why did the State accept
[a] (white) juror [. . .] who had a 17-year-old son?”).
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On the seventh day of trial, Jermaine’s case went to the jury. After
approximately three and one-half hours, the court received a note indicating the
jury was deadlocked. The judge charged the jury on Allen 31 and they continued
deliberations. One hour later, another jury note reported a deadlock and a vote:
11 not guilty, one guilty. After the foreman reported that further deliberation
would not be productive, the judge declared a mistrial. 32
The next day, we contacted one of the jurors seeking insight into the
deliberations. The conversation soon turned to the lone holdout for guilty. Much
to our chagrin, our holdout was a black man in his late 30s who worked for a
local government and appeared attentive, contemplative, even friendly each day
of trial as he sat neatly dressed on the front row. He fit the profile of an individual
who might be troubled by sloppy police work and sympathetic to a young black
child ensnared by a rush to clear the case. Unbeknownst to us, our holdout was
moonlighting as a preacher, a fact he shared with his fellow jurors when
explaining he was certain of Jermaine’s guilt because God had spoken to him
and told him so.

31 An Allen charge is “[a] supplemental jury instruction given by the court to encourage a deadlocked jury,
after prolonged deliberations, to reach a verdict[,]” which takes its name from the decision in Allen v. United
States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). ALLEN CHARGE, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Typically, the charge
informs the jury that (1) a new trial would be expensive for both sides, (2) there is no reason to believe another
jury would be better suited to reaching a decision, (3) it is important a unanimous verdict be reached, and (4) the
majority and the minority must give equal consideration to each other’s views in attempting to reach a verdict.
See, e.g., United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 935–41 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining the charge and holding a trial
court must give even-handed admonitions on the fourth prong).
32 Under South Carolina law, when a jury returns deadlocked a second time, “it shall not be sent out again
without its own consent unless it shall ask from the court some further explanation of the law.” S.C. Code Ann.
§ 14-7-1330 (1976); but cf. United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 127
(2015) (“To the extent Defendants suggest that a trial court should at no time give a second Allen charge, we
disagree.”).

